The presumption of advancement is a well-established equitable principle in English law. The presumption has traditionally operated to presume that a purchaser or transferor of property intended to transfer the beneficial interest to the recipient of property in certain relationships. However, its future is far from certain. The presumption has been subjected to significant criticism, including on the grounds that it is out-dated and discriminatory, and there are signs that courts are interpreting its scope narrowly to limit its impact. While it appeared that the presumption would be abolished by the Equality Act 2010 (UK) c 15 s 199, that section has never been brought into force. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the enduring impact of the presumption of advancement, and what its future might be.
I. Introduction
The presumption of advancement is a well-established equitable principle in English law. The presumption has traditionally operated to presume that a purchaser or transferor of property intended to transfer the beneficial interest to the recipient of property in certain relationships. However, its future is far from certain. The presumption has been subjected to significant criticism, including on the grounds that it is out-dated and discriminatory, and there are signs that courts are interpreting its scope narrowly to limit its impact. While it appeared that the presumption would be abolished by the Equality Act 2010 (UK) c 15 s 199, that section has never been brought into force. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the enduring impact of the presumption of advancement, and what its future might be.
This article commences with a brief discussion of the presumption of advancement in English law (Part II) and attempts to abolish the presumption via legislative reform (Part III). It then details a survey of UK case law, to ascertain how the presumption is operating in practice (Part IV). The article canvasses alternative approaches to dealing with the presumption, drawing on comparative perspectives and academic critiques (Part V). I argue that the law around the presumption remains unclear and in turmoil.
Therefore, while it is not necessary to abolish the presumption, reform is necessary.
II. The presumption of advancement
The presumption of advancement is a well-known equitable presumption. In equity, if a person purchases or transfers property to the name of another, the recipient is presumed to hold the property on resulting trust for the purchaser or transferor. 1 This presumption of a resulting trust may be rebutted by the presumption of advancement, 2 which traditionally presumes that the purchaser or transferor did intend to transfer the beneficial interest to the recipient, so long as the recipient is the male purchaser or transferor's wife, 3 fiancée or child; or if the purchaser or transferor stands in loco parentis to the recipient. The presumption of advancement (like the presumption of resulting trust) can be rebutted by contrary evidence. Thus, it is best regarded as a rule of evidence that shifts the burden of proof in certain cases: it is 'a circumstance of evidence which may rebut the presumption of resulting trust'. 4 As noted by Brightwell:
the presumption, whether of advancement or of resulting trust, provides a fallback position in those cases where, for whatever reason, there is no evidence (or no admissible evidence) of the purchaser's intention. Its purpose, accordingly, is to impute an intention. In this form, the presumption of advancement has been the subject of extensive legal and academic criticism. First, the presumption is often described as out-dated or antiquated, and is criticised for failing to reflect modern circumstances. In the House of Lords case of Pettitt v Pettitt, 8 Lord Reid doubted the relevance of the presumption in modern society, and questioned its logical foundation:
I do not know how this presumption first arose, but it would seem that the judges who first gave effect to it must have thought either that husbands so commonly intended to make gifts in the circumstances in which the presumption arises that it was proper to assume this where there was no evidence, or that wives' economic dependence on their husbands made it necessary as a matter of public policy to give them this advantage. I can see no other reasonable basis for the presumption. These considerations have largely lost their force under present conditions, and, unless the law has lost all flexibility so that the courts can no longer adapt it to changing conditions, the strength of the presumption must have been much diminished. to the mere fact that the husband had provided part of the purchase price of property conveyed into the name of the wife.
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Thus, the presumption has been described as a 'judicial instrument of last resort'.
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The courts have also minimised the impact of the presumption of advancement by holding it to be 'readily rebutted by comparatively slight evidence'. 15 As a result, the presumption will rarely '[prove] to be decisive'. 16 Further, as the common intention constructive trust comes to 'play a greater role in determining disputes over equitable interests in the home', 17 the presumption of advancement will have limited application to the family home, reducing the number of cases where it might be relevant. 18 Thus, 'the presumption of advancement, as between man and wife, which was so important in the 18th and 19th centuries, has now become much weakened, although not quite to the point of disappearance.' 19 As Lord Hodson noted in Pettitt v Pettitt:
In old days when a wife's right to property was limited, the presumption, no doubt, had great importance and to-day, when there are no living witnesses to a transaction and inferences have to be drawn, there may be no other guide to a decision as to property rights than by resort to the presumption of advancement. I do not think it would often happen that when evidence had been given, the presumption would today have any decisive effect. 20 Second, the presumption as it applies in English law has been criticised for arbitrarily distinguishing between different types of relationships. For example, the presumption does not apply if a marriage is void ab initio, 21 between de facto couples, between a man and his mistress, 22 or from a wife to her husband. 23 The presumption does apply, however, from a father to a legitimate child, 24 and from a man to his fiancée. 25 It is still contested whether the presumption applies from mother to child.
The Law Commission has described this collection of precedents as 'archaic and discriminatory', 26 particularly given the gendered distinctions between the obligations of husbands and wives and, historically, between mothers and fathers. 27 RichardsBray has argued:
The problem with the presumption of advancement, and the reason why we will almost certainly bid it farewell in the near future is that it is discriminatory in its operation. It operates on the historical, but outdated basis that men are in a financial position to care for their spouse and children;
whereas women are not. This presumption has operated for hundreds of years and its underlying premise may have been true at one time, but does not reflect the reality of modern life. Glister has argued that the presumption does not breach the protocol, as it is not 'properly seen as a right or responsibility of a private law character', 32 instead being a rule of evidence. Nevertheless, a number of attempts were made to ensure the presumption would not contravene article 5, allowing the government to fulfill its commitment to ratify the Protocol. The government explicitly noted its belief that the abolition of the presumption of advancement was necessary before ratifying the Protocol:
The Government are committed to signing and ratifying protocol 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights as soon as the necessary legislative changes have been made. In order to fulfil Article 5 of the protocol, which demands equality between spouses, it is necessary to … abolish the presumption of advancement in respect of gifts between husbands and wives, engaged couples and fathers and their children … . We will continue actively to seek a suitable legislative vehicle for these changes. to ratify that protocol, and they must do so on a United Kingdom-wide basis. (1) The presumption of advancement (by which, for example, a husband is presumed to be making a gift to his wife if he transfers property to her, or purchases property in her name) is abolished.
(2) The abolition by subsection (1) force. 39 Further, the Coalition government has not signed or ratified the Seventh Protocol, 40 and has no current plans to do so. 41 The effect has been to reduce any 38 Glister, 'Section 199 of the Equality Act 2010' (n 7) 823. Glister particularly criticises s 199(2): 's 199(2(a) is clear enough … but doubts remain over the ability of a judge to modify the presumption relationships in the meantime. incentive to reform the presumption of advancement. This may explain the failure to bring s 199 into force.
In sum, then, the law regarding the presumption of advancement remains 'uncertain and complex, and is likely to lead to arbitrary results.' 42 The sections that follow assess the practical impact of retaining the presumption of advancement as part of UK law. In the context of the acquisition of a family home, the presumption of a resulting trust made a great deal more sense when social and economic conditions were different and when it was tempered by the presumption of advancement. The breadwinner husband who provided the money to buy a house in his wife's name, or in their joint names, was presumed to be making In cases where the presumption did apply to the relationship, it was generally rebutted by the intention of the purchaser or transferor. For example, in Chaudhary v Chaudhary, 66 the recipient son argued that the presumption should allow him to keep a gift from his father. However, the presumption was rebutted by the father's subjective intention: 'Mr Chaudhary senior and his wife must have subjectively intended that the £5,000 would be for their benefit and so was not intended as a gift for Mr Chaudhary.' 67 Similarly, in EG v EG 68 the presumption (assuming it applied to a transfer from mother to daughter) was rebutted by documentary evidence of the mother's intention. 69 The presumption was also held not to apply in the case of bankruptcy: in KK v MA However, this does not mean that the presumption of advancement will not have any impact in cases in the future. According to the Law Commission, the illegality doctrine and reliance principle 72 have 'give[n] that presumption an overriding importance that it was never intended to have.' 73 This may lead to arbitrary results, disconnected from the merits of the case: 'The outcome of the case will turn solely on the procedural issue of whether any legal presumption is in play and how closely the illegality is tied up with any evidence that the parties may wish to rely on.' 74 Thus, the presumption may be determinative of individual rights, at least in cases of illegality.
IV. Enduring impact of the presumption of advancement
Further, the fact that even one case was decided on the basis of the presumption means that the presumption of advancement is continuing to have a lingering effect on UK law. At the same time, 'there has no been substantial discussion as to whether [the presumption] remains fit for purpose in any circumstances', including by Parliament or the Law Commission. 75 It is therefore necessary to consider whether this is a desirable state of affairs, and whether there is any alternative way for the law to be developed.
V. Options for the future
From the foregoing analysis, there appear to be four options for the future: to extend the presumption to other relationships, in order to remove its discriminatory effect; to maintain the status quo; to abolish the presumption prospectively; or to abolish the presumption with immediate effect.
A. Extend the presumption
To address the discriminatory impact of the presumption of advancement, an obvious solution would be to extend the presumption to other relationships, to bring mothers and wives within its ambit. This extension would make the presumption ostensibly gender-neutral in its application. This is consistent with the Law Commission's previous recommendation to extend to presumption to both spouses and the law in In the social and economic conditions which apply at the present time the drawing of a rigid distinction between male and female parents, for the purposes of the application of the presumptions of equity with which we are concerned, may be accepted to be inappropriate. I would be prepared, although with rather less conviction, to say the same about conditions in 1958.
I would, therefore, not decide this case upon the basis that, Mrs Brown being a mother rather than a father, the presumption of advancement did not apply. The extension of the presumption may also reflect the actual or assumed intentions of married couples and parents making transfers. According to Brightwell, parents generally intend to make gifts to their children, meaning that the presumption fits with the assumed intentions of the parties. 85 If the extension of the presumption would fit with individual intentions, this would obviously be an argument in favour of its retention and extension. However, attempting to predict or presume individual intentions is a tricky matter, which may be better left to the legislature. 86 Further, the 'presumption of the most likely intention' may well differ from country to country.
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In sum, then, the extension of the presumption of advancement to women may help to remedy its discriminatory impact, and may better reflect the presumed intention of parties in modern society. However, while extending the presumption would remedy any direct gender discrimination, it may lead to indirect discrimination against women. While the economic role and position of women has changed since the presumption was first applied, women continue to experience financial inequality and disadvantage in England. Writing about the Australian context, Sarmas has criticised the extension of the presumption to women. While rejecting an approach that treats women differently, the reliance on equality as 'sameness' is also harmful given This is also the case in the UK, which retains a male breadwinner/female part-timer gender arrangement within which men continue to dominate paid work, and women, although they are in employment on the whole, work shorter hours in the labor market than men and retain major responsibility for unpaid caring work. 89 Women generally spend fewer years in the labour market than men and are overconcentrated in lower-level and lower-waged jobs. 90 Thus, it is unsurprising that a 'gender wealth gap' persists between women and men in the UK. A 2013 survey of 2,059 adults in the UK found a 'gender wealth gap' of 17% between women and men. 91 As illustrated by Thus, while it is not desirable to retain the gendered distinctions in the presumption of advancement, it is also not desirable to extend the presumption to transfers by wives or mothers. 97 Further, it is unclear whether extending the presumption will actually help it to reflect the intentions of married couples or parents. For example, financial contributions by parents to their children are strongly influenced by class and ethnicity:
those in working-class occupations amass far fewer resources than their middle-class peers and hence face the joint prospect of poverty in old age and an inability to financially support their descendants. … Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and black respondents emerged as severely wealth-poor ethnic groups, building up meager levels of wealth and so accumulating little, if any, financial safety nets that could provide financial security either now or in the future, for themselves and their dependants. 98 Thus, the ability to make inter vivos gifts to children is better seen as a white, middleclass phenomenon, and inter vivos transfers may be more frequent among the wealthy:
